Not an Excessive Claim, Nor a Divisive One, But a Traditional One: A Response To Lawrence Welch on Immediate Material Cooperation by Keenan, James F.
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 67 | Number 4 Article 7
November 2000
Not an Excessive Claim, Nor a Divisive One, But a
Traditional One: A Response To Lawrence Welch
on Immediate Material Cooperation
James F. Keenan
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Keenan, James F. (2000) "Not an Excessive Claim, Nor a Divisive One, But a Traditional One: A Response To Lawrence Welch on
Immediate Material Cooperation," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 67: No. 4, Article 7.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol67/iss4/7
Not an Excessive Claim, 
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Here I respond to Dr. Lawrence Welch's critique' of my essay on 
immediate material cooperation and its application to a particular case of 
direct sterilization which appeared in this journal. I focus on four topics: the 
quality of his representation of my views, the concept of immediate material 
cooperation, the application of that concept, and the notion of division 
I. The Quality of His Representation of My Views 
In beginning, I acknowledge that the quality of representation is central 
to any debate. I appreciate the care with which WeIch read and presented 
my essays. Above all, I appreciate the time he spent on the case that I used 
which concerns the only Catholic health care facility, in an American city of 
about 100,000 people, which will lose its remarkable obstetrics staff who are 
observant of the Ethical and Religious Directives (ERD), if the facility does 
not cede to their one demand that contradicts the ERD: namely in the few 
cases where a woman has a cesarian delivery and requests a subsequent tubal 
ligation, the staff would honor that request for what they claim are a variety 
of compelling medical and ethical reasons. A further condition of the case is 
that the facility could not replace this staff; on the contrary, the staff is 
capable of establishing its own services elsewhere.3 This case could then be 
a rare instance of immediate material cooperation, if the bishop and the CEO 
were to judge prudentially that the loss of these services would compromise 
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the facility's mission. 
Nonetheless, there are a few points that he implicitly or explicitly 
attributes to me that need, however, to be corrected. Let me note them. 
Welch makes much of the fact that I wrote "duress appears repeatedly" in 
both the 1975 Responsum from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith (CDF) on sterilizations in Catholic Hospitals and the USCC-NCCB 
commentary on it. He correctly points out that the word doesn't appear in 
the former. 4 However, it is implicitly in the former, as it is explicitly in the 
latter. It must be: if there is no duress, there can be no legitimate material 
cooperation. Absent duress, cooperation is formal. My ascribing duress to 
the Responsum was simply to acknowledge that the Responsum foresaw the 
possibility of legitimate cooperation regarding sterilization (something which 
he acknowledges) and I added that the possibility could only be due to 
duress. I cannot imagine the Responsum making sense without the notion of 
duress. 
Later Welch ascribes to me a presupposition that is unfounded, that is, 
by extension I claim that the Responsum mentioned duress in connection 
with immediate material cooperation, that the Responsum "teach(es) even 
implicitly that duress somehow turns implicit formal cooperation into a 
permissible form of immediate material cooperation," and that the 
Responsum refers "even implicitly to immediate material cooperation under 
duress in the case of direct sterilization."s I never made any of those claims. 
I claimed simply that the Responsum aU-ows for material cooperation in 
sterilization. But I never suggested that the Responsum makes the type of 
technical distinctions thatWelch seems to think I did. 
II. The Concept of Immediate Material Cooperation 
How do I ground the concept immediate material cooperation? Years 
ago, I wrote the first of several articles on material cooperation. In doing 
research on it, I found that under extreme circumstances, manualists 
recognized a difference between implicit formal cooperation and immediate 
material cooperation. Like myself, they did not believe that the former 
"turned" into the latter, though Welch rhetorically admonishes me for doing 
just that. Rather, they recognized that an immediate involvement with the 
object of an intrinsically wrong action might not necessarily be implicit 
formal cooperation. That is, if a person were compelled into the immediate 
involvement, then the cooperation was not necessarily formal. I originally 
found these cases in Merkelbach and Noldin,6 and later in sixteenth century 
case handbooks, like the one by Dr. William Allen and Robert Persons.7 
None of these casuists ever made a general explanation of this distinction, 
nor did they systematize their thoughts, but they did recognize that on rare 
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occasions we should not call someone's immediate material cooperation 
implicit formal cooperation. 
I take exception then to Welch ' s rhetorical comment about duress 
"turn(ing) implicit formal cooperation into a permissible form of immediate 
material cooperation." Generally speaking, immediate material cooperation 
would be implicit formal , why else would there be immediate involvement? 
But in some rare instances, from those concerning matters of justice to the 
exchange of marital dues, casuists and manualists saw that immediate 
material cooperation was not considered implicit formal. Thus, it is not, as 
Welch suggests, an abuse of casuistry: we are not looking for excuses to do 
what we want to do nor are we trying to "tum" sinful cooperation into 
permitted cooperation. Rather for centuries moralists have occasionally 
asked, whether, when there is something we definitively oppose because it is 
counter to church teaching, must Church members always refrain from 
cooperating in that activity even when their failure to do so would mean the 
demise of their life, facility, or department? Here, I hasten to add that we 
would never ask the question about an activity that destroyed human life; 
both the ERD and Evangelium vitae have rightly pointed out that such 
activity could never be a matter of legitimate cooperation. 
Regardless of Welch ' s charges, I have never found nor claimed that 
magisterial documents address the distinction between immediate material 
and implicit formal. (Welch even suggests that I say that the NCCB 
commentary does.8) Rather I found it, as most moralists find traditional 
insights, in the writings of "approved theologians" in the casuist and 
manualist traditions. That location is where, normally, we find complicated 
methodological principles. 
Moreover, I think that critical reflection helps us to recognize that these 
theologians were right. Logically speaking, we could imagine as others in 
previous times have, that immediate material cooperation could be 
distinguishable under extreme duress from formal cooperation. The insight 
enjoys both internal and external certitude. Regarding the former, the 
claims are evidently cogent; regarding the latter, the claims have been 
supported by significant voices both historically and contemporaneously. 
Furthermore, the distinction is being well appropriated by a variety of 
other significant voices. Here I think of three relevant developments. First, 
the distinction appears in the ERD appendix. The appendix was developed 
by a committee (the Committee on Doctrine) of bishops and archbishops 
who were trained in moral theology and recognized the credibility of the 
distinction . Second, before the bishops voted on the ERD, that committee 
submitted the directives and the appendix to the CDF. After the CDF's 
approval , the committee presented it to their brother bishops who in turn 
consulted their advisors in moral theology. After months of consideration, 
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the chainnan of the bishops' committee presented the entire document to the 
NCCB for a vote and the chainnan specifically addressed the distinction in 
his presentation of the ERD before the full assembly of bishops. After broad 
consultation, then, with both CDF and the NCCB, the bishops voted 
unanimously for the document. Third, on later occasions, I have been told 
by bishops from other countries, that no less than Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger 
has told other national conferences of bishops that the NCCB' s ERD are 
worthy of imitation. I cannot imagine the cardinal making these 
recommendations without implicitly, at least, acknowledging the legitimacy 
of the distinction. 
Thus, regarding the distinction itself, I would be surprised were CDF 
or any official organ of the church to deny the moral intelligibility of the 
distinction. Likewise, I could not imagine that they would deny its 
traditional roots. I could imagine, however, that the CDF might want to 
insist on the rare application of the distinction. I have insisted on this point 
repeatedly. In fact, in the case that I presented, I explained that a bishop 
might (note: not should!) consider the case as indicative of the rare, but 
legitimate a type of immediate cooperation. I concluded that it was a case 
that would eventually belong to prudential judgment of those directly 
responsible. Thus I oppose any broad use of the distinction . Why? Because 
I do not believe there are many instances of extreme duress. 
Moreover, I add that while some health care facilities have 
attempted immediate material cooperation on sufficiently coercive grounds, 
others have not. That is, the latter could have avoided any immediate 
involvement in the action and still remained open to perform their mission. 
Thus, I do not deny that some facilities have illicitly used the distinction and 
those contracts will be recognized as illicit, not because they were instances 
of immediate material cooperation, but because that type of cooperation was 
actually avoidable, that is, they lacked sufficient duress. 
In. The Application of Immediate Material Cooperation 
to Direct Sterilization 
This brings us then to Welch's claim that regardless of the moral 
intelligibility of the distinction, its application to direct sterilization is 
already denied by the Responsum. Here Welch's argument depends on his 
translation of the word "admissa." Welch claims the word means "allow." 
He acknowledges that the translation from Origins reads "consents" and 
writes "The Latin is stronger than the English translation that appeared in 
Origins.,,9 Here, I think that Welch violates an important insight regarding 
the interpretation of Church documents: laws which prohibit ought never to 
be interpreted more strictly than the law states. I wonder why, then, he 
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insists on a more onerous translation than that byOrigins. 
I read the sentence from the Responsum: "Any cooperation of the 
hospitals which approves or consents to actions which are in 
themselves ... directed to a contraceptive end ... is absolutely forbidden." This 
sentence condemns, in my estimation, any formal cooperation in direct 
sterilization. 
Welch notes that the verbs are distinct. I agree: approves is an 
explicit, positive endorsement, while consent is the acknowledgment of an 
action as a good; the latter refers to implicit formal cooperation. Both, then, 
are illustrative of a will that formally cooperates. But Welch wants his 
alternative, "allows," to connote immediate material cooperation. In the 
process, then, he interprets theResponsum more restrictively than others do. 
Welch wants an a priori prohibition: regardless of an institution's 
survival, immediate material cooperation with direct sterilization (even in the 
very limited instance that I described) is never permissible. I see no warrant 
for that a priori. 
IV. Division or Communion 
Finally, Welch convicts me of ignoring an ecclesiology of 
communion. I find this charge overwrought and hardly persuasive. 
If Pope John Paul II or Cardinal Ratzinger declares that immediate 
material cooperation ought never be applied to direct sterilizations, I will 
submit immediately to that prudential judgment. But, inasmuch as I have 
never seen any such statement nor do I expect one, I see no need to restrict 
the Church's tradition now. In a time of enormous pluralism and diversity, 
the complexity of the principle of cooperation affords us a way of 
demarcating our positions, so as to protect our values and explain our roles 
in a variety of collaborative moves. Wisely, at a critical moment in charting 
the future of our health care facilities, our bishops and boards rely on 
traditional interpretations of traditional principles. 
Thus, I wonder why Welch wants to rule out applying a veritably 
credible concept that has its limited applicability in the extreme situation of 
the demise of one' s life, facility or department. Surely Welch's a priori 
exclusion means the automatic loss of a facility and/or a department that 
might otherwise have been protected by the principle of cooperation. 
Moreover, I know the distinction has relevance to other national 
conferences of catholic bishops and their health care facilities. Welch's 
argument endangers not only the existence of US facilities but also those 
elsewhere. If the application is still considered legitimate, is not Welch's 
attempt to foreclose on the concept itself divisive? Where, then, is the 
division? Is the division due to my interpretation or to Welch's own? 
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